Pollution Control and the Restriction of Trade in the Presence of Lobbying for the Environment by Higashida, Keisaku
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Pollution Control and the Restriction of Trade in
the Presence of Lobbying for the Environment
Author(s) Higashida, Keisaku
Citation Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 44(2): 105-122
Issue Date 2003-12
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version publisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/7673
RightPOLLUTION CONTROL AND THE RESTRICTION OF TRADE IN
THE PRESENCE OF LOBBYING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

K:>H6@J H><6H=>96
Faculty of Economics, Fukushima University
Fukushima 9601296, Japan
e038@ipc.fukushima-u.ac.jp
Received August 2001; Accepted March 2003
Abstract
This paper examines how lobbying activity for protection of the environment a#ects the
pollution and trade tax rates adopted by the government of a large importing country. We
demonstrate that, under certain conditions on the structure of demand and supply, both the tax
rates under lobbying are unambiguously higher than they would be in the absence of lobbying
when the domestic government determines them simultaneously. In addition, we consider the
e#ects of lobbying activity on the terms of trade and domestic prices.
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I. Introduction
In the last few decades, the environment has been deteriorating worldwide. People have
been made aware of environmental problems, such as global warming and the depletion of the
ozone layer. Countries have reached an agreement that they should co-operate to ﬁnd a
solution to those environmental problems.
1 It is widely recognized that the ﬁrst best solution
is a combination of Pigouvian tax and free trade. If all countries adopted this combination
with transfer payments, Pareto optimum could be achieved.
2 Hence, in terms of e$ciency,
trade policies should not be used for environmental purposes.
Some industrialized countries have insisted that trade and environmental policies should
be coordinated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) since global environmental problems
 This is based on a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 1997. I
wish to thank Professors Fumio Dei, Makoto Ikema, Jota Ishikawa, participants at the meeting, and an anony-
mous referee for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are entirely my own responsibility.
1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Montreal Protocol are examples.
2 See Markusen (1975 b) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996). Markusen (1975 b), Barrett (1994), Kennedy
(1994), and Ulph (1996) compared ‘the Prisoners’ Dilemma’ outcome with the Pareto optimum.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 44 (2003), pp.105-122.  Hitotsubashi Universityhave become the main issue, rather than local environmental degradation.
3 In practice, the
trade measures were put into e#ect to protect the environment outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country.
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Lobbying activity is considered to be an important factor in the determination of
environmental and trade policies. A number of environmental interest groups have been
organized and, accordingly, the pressure for the environment and against increasingly free
trade has grown.
5 Lobbying activity may inﬂuence government policy to become more
conservationist and more trade-restrictive.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how lobbying for protection of the environment
a#ects the pollution and trade tax rates adopted by the government of a large importing
country. We show that, the e#ects of lobbying on the tax rates are ambiguous when the
government can alter only one policy measure. The reason is that an increase (resp. a decrease)
in the trade tax (resp. the pollution tax) rate decreases foreign production, which leads to a
decrease in transboundary pollution, whereas domestic pollution increases. Which e#ect is
greater depends on the structure of demand and supply and on the seriousness of transbound-
ary pollution relative to domestic pollution. On the other hand, under certain demand and
supply structures, the government of the importing country necessarily raises both tax rates
when it is able to determine them simultaneously. The intuition is that the domestic govern-
ment can set both taxes for di#erent purposes. The pollution tax can be used to cope with
domestic pollution and to make the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the tax revenue
favorable to the environmental lobby group, whereas the trade tax can be used to deal with
foreign pollution and to make the terms of trade favorable to the domestic economy. Under
certain demand and supply structures, those e#ects make both taxes higher. Moreover, we also
consider the e#ects on the terms of trade and domestic consumer and producer prices.
Hillman and Urspring (1992) examined how environmental interest groups a#ect the
trade policy that protects domestic industries from import competition under international
oligopoly. Fredriksson (1997, 1999) was concerned with how lobbying activities by both
environmentalists and producers a#ect the pollution tax rate and the amount of pollution
emission in a small open economy model. However, they dealt with only one policy measure.
In contrast to those analyses, we consider both the pollution and trade taxes simultaneously.
Moreover, in contrast to Fredriksson (1997, 1999) we focus on a large importing country.
Rauscher (1997) took into consideration several kinds of policies and examined the e#ect of
lobbying activities both by the owners of the industry speciﬁc factor and the environmentalists
in a small open economy. Although he also referred to the two-large-country case, he
examined the case only with pollution taxes.
Schleich and Orden (2000) examined the e#ect of lobbying activity by producers on both
3 The EU has insisted that ‘trade and environment’ should be negotiated. At the Doha Ministerial Conference,
WTO members agreed to negotiations without prejudging their outcome on the elimination of tari# and non-tari#
barriers to environmental goods and services in the next Work Programme. However, trade policies for environ-
mental purposes will not be negotiated. See WTO (2001 a).
4 See WTO home page (http://www.wto.org./) on the tuna-dolphin case and see WTO (1998) on the Shrimp-
Sea turtle case. Ludema and Wooton (1994, 1997), and Furusawa, Higashida, and Ishikawa (2002) provided
theoretical analyses of this type of trade measure.
5 The failure of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting is a notable example. See Sampson (2000) on the environment
and the World Trade Organization (WTO) after the Seattle Ministerial Meeting.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +*0the pollution and trade taxes. In contrast to Schleich and Orden (2000), we deal with lobbying
activity by environmentalists. Conconi (2000) examined the e#ect of environmental lobbying
on both pollution and trade taxes in a symmetrical large country model. This study focused on
a comparison of the equilibrium pollution tax rate in the presence of environmental lobbying
and the Pigouvian rate. Since this study assumed symmetry between countries, no trade takes
place in equilibrium. We do not assume symmetry, and can consider the e#ect that lobbying
has on the restriction of trade.
There are three key features of this paper. First, we take into consideration transboundary
pollution. Global environmental problems and transboundary pollution have become more
serious and are di$cult to resolve. Hence, we examine this type of pollution.
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Second, we employ the common agency model introduced by Grossman and Helpman
(1994). In this model, an environmental interest group confronts the government with a
contribution schedule. The incumbent government chooses both the pollution and trade tax
rates to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and total political contributions.
Third, we do not exclude the possibility that the environmental lobby group takes into
consideration not only environmental degradation but also income redistribution. Aidt (1997)
examined the e#ects of lobbying activity by environmentalists on production and raw material
taxes in a small open economy and compared the case in which the environmental lobby group
cares about income redistribution with the case in which it does not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 examines the
equilibrium tax rates. Two cases are considered. In the ﬁrst, the government can use only one
policy measure, the pollution tax or the trade tax. In the second case, the government can
determine both the pollution and trade tax rates simultaneously. Section 4 deals with the e#ects
of lobbying on the terms of trade and on domestic consumer and producer prices. Section 5
provides concluding remarks.
II. The Model
There are two large countries: one is the home country and the other is the foreign
country. An asterisk (*) is used to denote foreign country variables. Assuming that foreign
policies are given, we focus on the home country.
Following Fredriksson (1997), we assume that citizens are heterogeneous. The population
of the home country is N, which is normalized to one. There are two types of citizens, workers
and environmentalists. Both types have l units of labor. Environmentalists are concerned with
environmental degradation, whereas workers are not. The fraction of environmentalists is a.
There are two sectors in both countries: one sector produces good z, which is the
numeraire, and the other sector produces good x. There is no pollution associated with the
production of z. The production of x emits pollution, which crosses the countries’ border.
Utility for each environmentalist (i) is given by:
U
E
i dz, iu[dx, i]q(XgX*), u0, u0, (1)
6 In the case of a small open economy, transboundary pollution cannot be examined since such an economy
cannot inﬂuence foreign production and, accordingly, foreign pollution.
EDAAJI>DC 8DCIGDA 6C9 I=: G:HIG>8I>DC D; IG69: >C I=: EG:H:C8: D; AD77N>C< 2003] +*1where dx(dz)a n dX(X*) denote the amount of x(z) consumed by each individual and the
amount of domestic (foreign) production, respectively. q and g denote disutility per unit of
domestic production and the seriousness of disutility from a unit of foreign production relative
to that from a unit of domestic production, respectively. If g1 (resp. g1), domestic
environmentalists su#er more from a unit of domestic (resp. foreign) production than from a
unit of foreign (resp. domestic) production. Square brackets represent functions throughout
the paper. Similarly, utility for each worker ( j) is given by:
U
W
j dz, ju[dx, j]. (2)
Only labor is used to produce good z. The production technology exhibits constant returns
to scale and an input-output coe$cient equal to one. The units of good z are chosen so that its
price equals unity in both countries. It is assumed that the aggregate supply of the input is
su$ciently large to produce a positive amount of z. A competitive equilibrium then implies a
wage rate equal to one.
Good x is produced using labor and a sector speciﬁc input, the supply of which is inelastic.
A proportion, b, of citizens own speciﬁc factors. A proportion, l, of these speciﬁc factor
owners are environmentalists. All speciﬁc factor owners own the same amount of the factor.
The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale. With the wage rate ﬁxed to one,
the speciﬁc factor reward is given by:
pP[px], P 0, P0, (3)
where px denotes the producer’s price. By Hotelling’s lemma, the supply function is given by:
X[px]P [px]. (4)
We employ a common agency model of lobbying introduced by Grossman and Helpman
(1994). Environmentalists in the domestic country organize themselves into a lobby group.
They inﬂuence the government’s policies by making campaign contribution schedules, C[t, t],
where t and t denote the pollution tax rate and the trade tax rate, respectively. Following
Fredriksson (1997), we assume that workers and foreign citizens do not organize a lobby
group.
7
Each environmentalist solves the following utility maximization problem:
maxdz, i, dx, iU
E





where pd and TR denote, respectively, the consumer’s price and the total tax revenue which is
redistributed uniformly to all citizens. Ci represents the contribution borne by environmentalist
i. Moreover, I1 if a citizen (environmentalist or worker) owns the sector speciﬁc factor
whereas I0 if a citizen does not own the sector speciﬁc factor. Similarly, the utility
maximization problem for each worker is:
maxdz, dxU
W
j dz, ju[dx, j]( 6 )
7 To focus on the e#ect of environmental lobbying activity, we do not consider industrialist or worker lobby
groups.




It is assumed that l is large enough to consume good z even if a citizen does not own the sector




where D denotes the total demand. We examine two kinds of taxes, the pollution tax (t)a n d
the trade tax (t).
9 It is assumed that the home country imports good x. Then, the positive sign
in relation to t means that the domestic government has imposed a tari#.
10 Total tax revenue,
which is distributed uniformly to all individuals, is written as:
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TRt(DX)tX.( 8 )
In contrast to Fredriksson (1997), since we assume that the country is large, the e#ect of
the change in tax rates on the international price must be taken into consideration. From the
law of one price, the following equation holds:
pdpxtpt,( 9 )
where p denotes the international price. Moreover, since total world supply must equal total
world consumption, the following equation holds:
M[pd, px]M*[p* d, p* x]0, (10)
where M[pd, px]D[pd]X[px]a n dM*[p* d, p* x]D*[p* d]X*[p* x]. From Equation (9),
Equation (10) is rewritten as:
D[pt]X[ptt]D*[pt*]X*[pt*t*]0. (11)
By the implicit function theorem and the assumption that foreign tax rates are ﬁxed, the







D X D* X*
, (12)
8 In this model, environmentalists do not take environmental damage into consideration when determining the
amount of consumption, although an increase in consumption causes environmental damage by increasing produc-
tion. We implicitly assume that each individual’s share of consumption is very small. However, this assumption is
not crucial for our results. Even if environmentalists are assumed to consider the e#ect of their own consumption
and consume less than workers, we obtain the same results.
9 We do not take into account technology change. Consequently, the pollution tax has the same e#ect as the
production tax.
10 Any country participating in the WTO cannot use trade policy to a#ect the pollution that is emitted outside
its jurisdiction. However, some multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have trade provisions, although
clariﬁcation of the WTO-MEA interface is currently in dispute at the WTO (See WTO (1999, 2000, 2001 b)).
Consequently, as noted in Markusen (1975), it is important to consider the incentives for a large country to
inﬂuence foreign pollution in the presence of transboundary pollution.
11 When the government can use only the trade tax, TR0 may hold. In this case, it is collected uniformly
from all individuals.

























From the assumption on the shape of u and P, we obtain D 0a n dX 0. With similar
assumptions on the foreign demand and supply functions, we obtain D* 0a n dX* 0.
Social welfare consists of the sum of labor income, the rewards to the speciﬁc factors,
total tax revenue, and the consumers’ surplus, minus the disutility from degradation of the
environment:
W[t, t]LpTR{u[D[pd]]pdD[pd]}aq(XgX*), (14)
where L denotes the sum of labor income. The objective of incumbent politicians is to get
re-elected. The probability of re-election depends positively on social welfare. Contributions
can also be used to increase the probability of re-election since they can be used for election
campaigns. Thus, the domestic government maximizes a weighted sum of social welfare and
contributions from environmentalists:
GW[t, t; K]kC[t, t]W[t, t]C[t, t]
(k1)C[t, t]W[t, t]
KC[t, t]W[t, t], (15)
where K(k10) is the exogenously given weight that the government places on campaign
contributions relative to social welfare.
The structure of the two-stage game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the environmental




In the second stage, the domestic government sets the tax rates, and receives the contribution
associated with those rates. It is assumed that the environmental lobby group never breaks its
promise. It is also assumed that la since our purpose is to extract the e#ect of lobbying
activity not by the speciﬁc factor owners but by environmentalists.
The case of la should be noted. It implies that the ratio of environmentalists to all
citizens equals the ratio of the speciﬁc factors owned by environmentalists to all speciﬁc
factors. In such a case, in comparison to social welfare, the domestic government gives weight
only to the disutility from pollution emission. Therefore, with regard to the direction of tax
rate changes, the results are the same as those when the environmental lobby group cares only
about the disutility from pollution emission.
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1. Equilibrium Characteristics
In this section, we describe political equilibria. We consider two cases: ﬁrst, the govern-
ment can set only one policy measure; and second, the government can set both the pollution
and trade taxes simultaneously. We begin with the characterization of equilibria.
Following Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman (1994), if the domestic government




0) is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium i#
(i) C












(iv) (t ¯ , t ¯ ) maximizes KC
0[t, t]W[t, t] on Ts uch that C
0[t ¯ , t ¯ ]0, where (t ¯ , t ¯ ) denote
the equilibrium tax rates without any lobbying activities.
Condition (i) requires that the contribution schedule o#ered by the environmental lobby
group is feasible. Condition (ii) implies that the government maximizes its own welfare (GW)
given the contribution schedule o#ered. Condition (iii) implies that the joint welfare of the
environmental lobby group and the government should be maximized in equilibrium. If this is
not true, environmentalists can bias the equilibrium tax rates in favor of themselves by altering
their contribution schedule. Condition (iv) implies that the environmental lobby group
increases its welfare level by lowering its contribution schedule until the government is
indi#erent between (t
0, t
0) and (t ¯ , t ¯ ). In terms of the environmental lobby group’s welfare, the
former tax rates are preferable to the latter.
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0, for sto rt. (17)


























If the domestic government can use only one policy measure, characterization of the
equilibrium is similar. Therefore, Equation (19) can be rewritten as:
12 For the intuition behind the case in which more than one lobby group exists, see Fredriksson (1997).
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E[t
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(t
0 (20)








0; t ˆ ]
(t
0 (21)
for the case of the trade tax, where t ˆand t ˆdenote the exogenously given tax rates.
2. Equilibrium Situations with Single Policy Measure
We now examine the equilibrium situation in which the domestic government can alter
only one policy measure in response to lobbying activity. First, we examine the case in which
the domestic government can use only the pollution tax. The domestic government chooses the
pollution tax rate to maximize its own welfare given the trade tax rate. From Equation (20),
the ﬁrst order condition is:
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a(K1)q(D D (1g)X )
(Ka1)(D D X )
. (24)
The ﬁrst term in the equilibrium tax rate is due to the terms of trade e#ect. The domestic
government has an incentive to lower the tax rate, which leads to a lower international price.
The second and third terms are due to a change in the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the
total tax revenue. The last term represents the tax on pollution emission. Taking into
consideration both domestic and transboundary pollutions, the domestic government sets the
pollution tax rate.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ++,With regard to the e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the pollution tax
rate, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the domestic government can use only the pollution tax. If the
disutility from a unit of foreign production is smaller than that from a unit of domestic
production (g1), the pollution tax rate under lobbying is unambiguously higher than it would
be in the absence of lobbying. However, if g1, the result may be reversed.
See Appendix A for proof.
The intuition is as follows. If g1, an increase in the pollution tax rate unambiguously
decreases the aggregate disutility from the pollution emission that is experienced by environ-
mentalists. Moreover, a part of environmentalists, who do not own the speciﬁc factor, do not
care about the reward to the speciﬁc factors. Therefore, if g1, the domestic government can
improve its own welfare by raising the pollution tax rate.
Second, we examine the case in which the domestic government can use only the trade
tax. The domestic government chooses the trade tax rate to maximize its own welfare given the
pollution tax rate. From Equation (21), the ﬁrst order condition is:
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** *     a(K1)q{X (D X )gX (D X )}
(Ka1)(D X )(D X )
. (27)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to a standard optimal tari# in the context of international
economics, which is due to the terms of trade e#ect. The second and third terms are due to a
change in the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the total tax revenue. A change in the trade
tax rate alters both domestic and foreign productions, which implies that both domestic and
EDAAJI>DC 8DCIGDA 6C9 I=: G:HIG>8I>DC D; IG69: >C I=: EG:H:C8: D; AD77N>C< 2003] ++-foreign pollution emissions also change. This e#ect is represented by the last term.
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With regard to the e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the trade tax rate,
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the domestic government can use only the trade tax. If g0 the
trade tax rate under lobbying is unambiguously lower than it would be in the absence of lobbying.
Otherwise, the e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the direction of a change in the
trade tax rate is ambiguous.
See Appendix Bf or proof.
The intuition is as follows. g0 implies that there is no transboundary pollution. A
decrease in the trade tax rate reduces domestic production, which leads to a decrease in the
aggregate disutility from the pollution emission that is experienced by environmentalists.
Moreover, similarly to the case of the pollution tax only, a part of environmentalists do not
care about the reward to the speciﬁc factors. Therefore, if g0, the domestic government can
improve its own welfare by lowering the trade tax rate.
3. The Equilibrium Situation with Both Pollution and Trade Taxes
In this subsection, we examine the equilibrium situation in which the government can use
both the pollution and trade taxes simultaneously. We describe the equilibrium rates, and then
compare the direction of the changes in the tax rates with the result obtained in the previous
subsection.
The ﬁrst order conditions are given by (GW[t, t; K]/(t0a n d(GW[t, t; K]/(t0,

























Substituting Equations (12) and (13) into Equations (22) and (25), the equilibrium rates of

















With regard to the e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the tax rates, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the following two conditions hold simultaneously:
X0, and (31)
13 Markusen (1975 a) obtained this result in the absence of lobbying activity using a general equilibrium
approach.
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    (Ka1)(DX)(X* D* )
D* X*

a(K1)qg(X* D* D* X* )
D* X*
0. (32)
Then, both tax rates under lobbying are unambiguously higher than they would be in the absence
of lobbying.
See Appendix C for proof and for the implications of the two conditions.
The e#ects on the tax rates in the case in which both taxes can be set simultaneously
contrasts with those in the case in which the government can use only one policy measure.
Proposition 4 implies that a large importing country necessarily increases the distortion from
trade policy as long as the two conditions are satisﬁed.
The intuition is as follows. It is clear from Equation (29) that the pollution tax has two
roles. One is to deal with domestic pollution, which must be higher with lobbying activity by
environmentalists for a given t. The other is to make the sum of the consumers’ surplus and
the total tax revenue favorable to the environmental lobby group, which may not be enhanced
for a given t. The latter role is speciﬁc to the case in which there is lobbying activity. It is also
clear from Equation (30) that the trade tax has two roles. One is to make the terms of trade
favorable to the domestic economy. The other is to deal with transboundary pollution. With
lobbying activity by environmentalists, both e#ects do not necessarily make the trade tax rate
higher for a given t. However, Proposition 4 implies that, in equilibrium, both tax rates
eventually increase in the presence of lobbying activity by environmentalists as long as the two
conditions are satisﬁed. The point is that the domestic government can use both taxes for
di#erent purposes.
Three points should be noted. First, the result does not depend on the share of the speciﬁc
factors that are owned by environmentalists (l). In the case in which the domestic government
can use only one policy measure, it plays an important role in determining the e#ect of
lobbying activity by environmentalists. However, it does not matter when the domestic
government can set both taxes simultaneously.
Second, as long as the two conditions are satisﬁed, the result also does not depend on the
seriousness of pollution emission from a unit of foreign production relative to that from a unit
of domestic production (g). For example, if the demand and supply functions are linear,
irrespective of the value of g, the two conditions are satisﬁed.
Third, it is possible that lobbying activity by environmentalists induces the domestic
government to lower those tax rates if the two conditions in Proposition 4 are not satisﬁed. In
such a case, the result obtained in Proposition 4 may be reversed.
IV. Terms of Trade and Domestic Prices
In the previous section, we showed that, under certain conditions, environmental lobbying
activity provides the domestic government with an incentive to increase both the pollution and
trade tax rates, when the government can set them simultaneously. However, we did not refer to
the terms of trade (the international price) and the domestic consumer and producer prices. In
this section, we consider the e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on those prices.
14
14 We do not refer to the case with one policy measure explicitly since the results are obvious.
EDAAJI>DC 8DCIGDA 6C9 I=: G:HIG>8I>DC D; IG69: >C I=: EG:H:C8: D; AD77N>C< 2003] ++/In particular, for simplicity, we focus on the case where demand and supply functions are
linear (DXD*X*0), which satisﬁes the conditions in Proposition 4.
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First, we examine the terms of trade (the international price), p. From Equations (11),
































































Since (p/(t0a n d(p/(t0 hold, it is clear that the e#ect of an increase in the pollution tax
rate and the e#ect of an increase in the trade tax rate work in opposite directions. Thus, the
e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the international price is generally ambigu-
ous. This implies that the increase in the trade tax rate does not necessarily reduce the volume
of trade.
However, one point should be noted. The ﬁrst two terms in the braces of Equation (33)
are the same as in Equation (37). The third term in the braces is negative, which does not
appear when the domestic government can use only the trade tax rate. In comparison to the
case with the trade tax only, the domestic government has an additional incentive to restrict
trade. The intuition is as follows. From Equation (30), the role of the trade tax in dealing with
transboundary pollution is enhanced by the lobbying activity of environmentalists. However,
if the domestic government cannot alter the pollution tax rate, the domestic government must
take into consideration domestic pollution and the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the total
tax revenue when it sets the trade tax rate, which weakens the domestic government’s incentive
to raise the trade tax. For example, an increase in the trade tax rate necessarily increases
domestic pollution. On the other hand, if the domestic government can alter the pollution tax
rate, it can deal with domestic pollution and the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the total
tax revenue by changing the pollution tax rate. Therefore, the constraint on the trade tax rate
does not exist.
Next, we examine the domestic consumer price, pt. From Equations (11), (44), and




















Thus, we ﬁnd that lobbying activity by environmentalists necessarily raises the domestic
consumer price. This result contrasts with the case with one policy measure.
Finally, we examine the domestic producer’s price, ptt. From Equations (11), (44),



























15 Even if we consider the case in which demand and supply functions are not linear, the results do not change
as long as the conditions in Proposition 4 are satisﬁed.


















































As with the case of the international price, it is clear that the e#ect of an increase in the
pollution tax rate and the e#ect of an increase in the trade tax rate work in opposite directions.
Thus, the e#ect of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the domestic producer price is
generally ambiguous. This implies that lobbying activity by environmentalists does not
necessarily disadvantages the domestic owners of the speciﬁc factor.
However, compared with Equation (36), an additional term exists in Equation (35), (p/
(t(p/(t, which is negative. This implies that, in comparison to the case with the pollution
tax only, the domestic government has an additional incentive to restrict domestic production.
The reason is that, if the domestic government cannot alter the trade tax rate, the domestic
government must take into consideration the terms of trade e#ect and foreign pollution when
it sets the pollution tax rate, which weakens the domestic government’s incentive to raise the
pollution tax. For example, an increase in the pollution tax rate necessarily increases the
foreign pollution. On the other hand, if the domestic government can alter the trade tax rate,
it can deal with foreign pollution and the terms of trade e#ect by changing the trade tax rate.
Therefore, the constraint on the pollution tax rate does not exist.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined the e#ects of lobbying activity by environmentalists on the
pollution and trade tax rates adopted by the government of a large importing country. We have
employed the common agency model introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994).
First, we have considered the case in which the government could use only one policy
measure. We have demonstrated that the e#ects of lobbying activity by environmentalists on
the tax rates are ambiguous. The direction of a change in each tax rate depends not only on the
structure of demand and supply but also on the seriousness of pollution emission from a unit
of foreign production relative to that from a unit of domestic production and on the share of
the speciﬁc factors owned by environmentalists.
Second, we have examined the case in which the government could set both the pollution
and trade tax rates simultaneously. In this case, under certain conditions on the structure of
demand and supply, both tax rates are unambiguously higher when there is lobbying by
environmentalists than they would be in the absence of lobbying.
Third, we have examined the e#ects on the terms of trade and domestic prices. We have
demonstrated that the domestic consumer’s price necessarily rises when the domestic govern-
ment can use both the pollution and trade taxes. Moreover, lobbying activity by environmen-
talists might worsen the terms of trade of the foreign country. If the domestic government can
use both taxes, it has an additional incentive to lower the international price in comparison to
the case in which it can alter only the trade tax.
The case of a small open economy is worth mentioning. A small open economy cannot
inﬂuence the international price and, accordingly, transboundary pollution. Therefore, the
EDAAJI>DC 8DCIGDA 6C9 I=: G:HIG>8I>DC D; IG69: >C I=: EG:H:C8: D; AD77N>C< 2003] ++1domestic government cannot use taxes both to deal with transboundary pollution and to make
the terms of trade favorable to the domestic economy. Therefore, the trade tax rate equals zero
and is not inﬂuenced by lobbying activity, when the domestic government can set both the tax
rates simultaneously. However, the trade tax rate may not equal zero when the domestic
government can alter only the trade tax, since it can be used to deal with domestic pollution.
It should be noted that some issues are beyond the scope of this paper. First, we have not
considered the response of the foreign government, or lobbying by foreign environmentalists,
which we intend to do in the future. Second, we have not taken into account lobbying by
producers. The case in which both lobby groups exist is also worth examining.
Nevertheless, the propositions obtained in this paper have important policy implications,
since some existing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) contain trade provisions,
and, without the hope of establishing an MEA on transboundary pollution between almost all
countries, incentives and pressure for unilateral trade measures to be undertaken to protect the
global environment will increase.
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A Proof of Proposition 2












































If g1, X((p/(t1)gX* (p/(t0 holds. Thus, d
2GW/dKdt0i fg1. Q.E.D.
B Proof of Proposition 3
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[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ++2As noted in the paragraphs right after Proposition 4, the domestic government can beneﬁt
from the following four factors: to make the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the total tax
revenue favorable to the environmental lobby group; to deal with domestic pollution; to make
the terms of trade favorable to the domestic economy; and to deal with transboundary
pollution. It is clear from Equation (29) that Y1 represents the e#ect of the second derivative
of the domestic supply function on the ﬁrst factor. Similarly, from Equation (30), Y2 and Y3
represent the e#ects of the second derivatives of the foreign demand and supply functions on
the third and the forth factors, respectively. The second factor does not depend on the second
derivatives of the demand and supply functions.
If the ﬁrst condition in Proposition 4 ((31)) is satisﬁed, Y10 holds. The second
condition in Proposition 4 ((32)) is the same as Y2Y30.












































































































































































































which implies that the domestic government has an incentive to raise one tax rate as the other
tax rate increases. In other words, the two taxes are complements.
Since the domestic government can set both the pollution and trade tax rates simultane-
ously, changes in those rates according to a small increase in K can be written as follows:
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